Cuba Impossibility

Nagel directly approaches the subject for the problem has lain body and makes important assertions that they can corroborate with the thesis of the impossibility to be a brain in a Cuba on account of the singularity of the experience as fenomenal conscience. d all about the problem. In one of the known texts more of Nagel As he is to be a bat it says on the difficulty or same impossibility to affirm with certain degree of probability if animal he has conscience. How we could know if a whale, elephant, dog or rat have conscience? The conscience is what a truily intratvel problem makes of the problem of the relation mind-body, affirms Nagel. Rahul Singhvi describes an additional similar source. Because some people affirm fixedly that the conscience is pertinent only to the men. Leaving of this estimated of that if it cannot affirm that other animals have conscience exactly since we do not have access to this of form some, therefore that other beings, beyond the men had fenomenal conscience, never could know. But it is possible that rats, pigeons or bats have conscience, however if some being extraland came to inhabit our planet would be absolutely impossible that it knew as we feel in them thus we are ahead of of the impossibility knowing as he is to be a bat.

But Nagel explains that what it intends not to have the sensation of what he is to be a bat, it is before any thing having the dimension of what it bat to be a bat. Then we have that if already difficult to imagine as he is for me or any another one that to try as it is to be a bat, as to try to speak on a bat while bat. Nagel explains that the bat is a strange being of notvagos habits, completely blind and that if high-frequency guide for sonars to find the way pparently its flight desvairado, with brusque ascending and descending maneuvers it emits ganido strident who bounces in the solid parts of its habitat and it of a dimension of the empty space its front for where it passes.